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CASES NOTED
Florida Puts Federal Removal Jurisdiction and
the Thirteenth Amendment in the Doghouse
A Florida Supreme Court decision contradicts prior law by find-
ing that, during an attempted removal to federal court, the state
trial court did not lose jurisdiction if the removal was improper.
The author suggests that imprisonment under the state court's
order, while removal was attempted, was a denial of due process.
In addition, it is contended that the order compelling the defen-
dants to comply with a personal services contract or face impri-
sionment for contempt, contravenes the thirteenth amendment.
The owner of a Florida dog track instituted suit against 23
kennel owners and their association, seeking both a temporary and
a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant kennel
owners to comply with contracts providing for the furnishing of
greyhounds to the race track. On June 30, 1975, the Circuit Court
of Dade County issued an order restraining removal of the dogs from
the court's jurisdiction and ordered a hearing to be held on July 3,
1975. The kennel owners appeared at the hearing, announced that
a petition for removal to federal court had been filed, and requested
permission to withdraw from the hearing, which the circuit court
granted. At 5:55 p.m. of the same day, the federal court remanded
the cause. At 6:10 p.m. the circuit court entered an order granting
the temporary mandatory injunction which demanded immediate
compliance with the contracts by the filing of racing entries no later
than the next day. The order also provided that, upon refusal of the
kennel owners to file entries, custody of the dogs would be delivered
to a receiver. The kennel owners refused to submit the entries and
the receiver took custody. At the receiver's request,' custody of the
dogs was returned to the kennel owners, who were adjudged guilty
of contempt for violating the order to comply with their contracts.
Eighteen of the kennel owners were incarcerated as a result. The
jailed kennel owners brought a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme
1. Apparently, the receiver was unable to cope with the dogs, and asked the trial court
to return the greyhounds to their owners. 317 So. 2d 732, 735 (Fla. 1975).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Court of Florida.2 The court held, affirmed: Since the attempted
removal to federal court was improper, it did not deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction. Therefore, the July 3rd order granting the tem-
porary mandatory injunction was proper, even if, as alleged by the
kennel owners, the disputed contracts involved personal services.
Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1975).
Several aspects of the court's decision present disturbing impli-
cations. First, the court's rejection of the kennel owners' contention
that the state trial court was without jurisdiction from the time the
removal petition was filed until the time it was denied seems to
contradict an almost unanimous battery of cases4 and writers.'
The court's action may be best explained as a confusion be-
tween the old and new removal statutes. Under the prior statute, 6
the petition for removal was initially filed in the state court, with a
copy of the petition then being filed in the federal court. The old
statute provided, in pertinent part, that it was "the duty of the
State court to accept said petition and bond and proceed no further
in such suit."
In Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stevens,7 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the rule to mean "that proceed-
ings in the state court subsequent to the petition for removal are
valid if the suit was not in fact removable. . . . ,, This was "the
logical corollary of the proposition that such proceedings are void if
the cause was removable." ' The rule meant that a defendant who
sought removal could be deprived of his opportunity to defend in the
2. The kennel owners had taken an interlocutory appeal from the circuit court's July 3rd
order. The interlocutory appeal was consolidated for review with the writ of habeas corpus.
3. The court also held that the interlocutory appeal did not operate as an automatic stay
of the injunction and that the kennel owners contracts with the dog track were not void for
lack of mutuality. Also, the court held that their opinion was not res judicata to the main
proceeding of the cause.
4. E.g., United States ex rel. Echevarria v. Silberglitt, 441 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1971); Adair
Pipelines Co. v. Pipeliners Local 798, 325 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1963); Hopson v. North Am. Ins.
Co., 71 Idaho 461, 233 P.2d 799 (1951); Schuchman v. State, 250 Ind. 408, 236 N.E.2d 830
(1968); State ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 90 So. 2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1956); Bean v. Clark,
226 Miss. 892, 85 So. 2d 588 (1956); State v. Price, 15 N.C. App. 599, 190 S.E.2d 403 (1972).
Contra, F & L Drug Corp. v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 200 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1961).
5. 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 107, at 526 (C.
Wright ed. 1960); IA J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.168[3.-8], at 511 (2d ed. 1974).
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 29, 36 Stat. 1095, formerly codified as 28 U.S.C. § 72
(1946).
7. 312 U.S. 563 (1941).




state court during the time between attempted removal and re-
mand. While the defendant was in the federal court asking for re-
moval, the plaintiff could proceed in state court in a proceeding that
was ex parte unless the defendant had legal representation in both
places.'0
The current statute specifying the procedure for removal (en-
acted in 1948) changes the old statute considerably. One important
change is that the petition for removal is now filed in the federal,
rather than state, court. Section 1446(e) of Title 28, United States
Code (1970) provides:
Promptly after the filing of such petition and bond the defendant
or defendants shall give written notice thereof to all adverse par-
ties and shall file a copy of the petition with the clerk of such
State court, which shall effect the removal and the State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.
(emphasis added)
Cases have interpreted section 1446(e) to mean that the state
court is divested of all jurisdiction while removal is attempted, even
if the federal court later remands the cause." In 1971, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in South Carolina v.
Moore," presented a thoughtful discussion of the difference between
the two removal statutes. "Since the adoption of § 1446," stated the
court, "it has been uniformly held that the state court loses all
jurisdiction to proceed immediately upon the filing of the petition
in the federal court and a copy in the state court."' 3 The court took
cognizance of what it described as the "Rives-Metropolitan" rule,"
which, as the court stated, provided "that if the facts stated in the
removal petition were insufficient for removal, the state court could
ignore the petition, and proceedings conducted in the state court in
10. See Hopson v. North Am. Ins. Co., 71 Idaho 461, 465, 233 P.2d 799, 801 (1951):
The import of the decisions under 28 U.S.C.A. § 72 is clear to the effect that the
defendant when petitioning for removal must assume the consequences if the case
is remanded and he does not preserve his rights in the State court, because as
the Act has been construed by the courts if the case was remanded for want of
jurisdiction, the Federal Court is regarded as never having acquired jurisdiction.
11. See cases cited in note 4 supra.
12. 447 F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1971).
13. Id. at 1073.
14. The Moore court's "Rives-Metropolitan" rule was actually a synthesis of three cases:
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 312 U.S. 563 (1941), was the latest distillation of
two earlier cases interpreting this facet of the old removal rule, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879), and Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457 (1879).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the interval between the filing of the petition and a subsequent
federal remand order were not invalid."'" However, the Moore court
was unpersuaded:
It is clear, however, that § 1446, in providing for the filing of the
petition in the district court while promptly thereafter filing a
copy in the state court and giving notice to adverse parties was
designed to make removal effective by the performance of those
acts. The removal was no longer dependent upon any judicial act
in any state or federal court. The new procedure effectively re-
versed the premise underlying the Rives-Metropolitan rule.,'
Not all cases, however, have interpreted section 1446(e) to
mean that a state court is divested of all jurisdiction when removal
is attempted. In F & L Drug Corp. v. American Central Insurance
Co., 7 cited by the Supreme Court of Florida in Wilson v.
Sandstrom, the United States District Court for the District of Con-
necticut, in construing section 1446(e), held:
It is well settled that, if, upon the face of the record, including
the petition for removal, a suit does not appear to be a removable
one, then the state court is not bound to surrender its jurisdic-
tion.'
This statement, however, was supported by citation to five cases,
all of which were decided on the basis of the pre-1948 statute rather
than section 1446(e). Thus, in light of later cases and the express
wording of the statute itself, this apparently unique holding appears
to be erroneous.
Since the supreme court relied on what appears to be an incor-
rect decision, their holding concerning the removal issue is thus also
arguably erroneous. Had the Supreme Court of Florida given effect
to the seemingly unambiguous wording of section 1446(e), the July
3rd order of the trial court should have been held void since that
order was based upon testimony and evidence taken after removal
and prior to remand."' Moreover, at no time were the defendants
present after removal,2" yet evidence was heard ex parte and a deci-
15. 447 F.2d at 1072-73.
16. Id. at 1073.
17. 200 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1961).
18. Id. at 723.




sion was handed down 15 minutes after remand. The July 3rd deci-
sion was the basis for all of the subsequent orders, including the
contempt citations, for which the defendants were later incarcer-
ated. It would thus appear that the imprisonment of the defendants
for disobeying a void order was a denial of their right to due process
of law, since it is axiomatic in Florida, as elsewhere, that a court
cannot hold anyone in contempt of a void order."
Apart from the removal question, a second troublesome issue
raised by Wilson v. Sandstrom involves the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida's approval of the use of a mandatory injunction to compel per-
formance of the kennel owners' contracts. The court held a manda-
tory injunction proper if "irreparable harm will otherwise result, the
party has a clear legal right thereto, and such party has no adequate
remedy at law."22 Additionally, the Supreme Court of Florida found
it necessary to consider the public interest.
Traditionally, American courts have been reluctant to grant
mandatory injunctions to enforce personal services contracts. This
reluctance stems both from familiar equity principles and the
constitutional proscription of the thirteenth amendment.
Many courts have indicated that neither specific performance
nor injunction against threatened breach will be granted as a rem-
edy if the subject matter of the proceeding is a personal services
contract. 3 Professor Corbin and others 4 have inveighed against
granting equitable remedies to force the fulfillment of personal serv-
ices contracts. The primary reasons appear to be the difficulty of
enforcing the decree and of gauging the quality of the performance
rendered, 5 as well as the "strong prejudice against any kind of invol-
21. State ex rel. Everett v. Petteway, 131 Fla. 516, 179 So. 666 (1938). In other words,
"a state court is without power to hold one in contempt for violating an injunction that the
state court had no power to enter by reason of federal pre-emption." In re Green, 369 U.S.
689, 692 (1962).
22. 317 So. 2d at 736.
23. E.g., Robinson v. Sax, 115 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
24. 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1203 (1964); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 307, 308
(1932).
25. It seems that this contention is especially valid in the instant case, when the public
is encouraged to wager their money on greyhounds trained by men who are compelled by court
order to work. In Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 339 (1870), the United States
Supreme Court refused to order specific performance of a contract to deliver marble because
"the court is incapable of determining whether [the sellers] accord with the contract or not.
The agreement being for a perpetual supply of marble, no decree the court can make will end
the controversy."
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untary personal servitude.""
This strong prejudice against involuntary personal servitude
stems from the thirteenth amendment's dictate that "[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Arthur
v. Oakes 7 is the leading case which extends this principle to per-
sonal services contract situations. That case involved a strike of
railroad employees. In denying the validity of an order restraining
the employees from leaving the employ of the railroad, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:
It would be an invasion of one's natural liberty to compel him to
work for or to remain in the personal service of another. One who
is placed under such constraint is in a condition of involuntary
servitude,-a condition which the supreme law of the land de-
clares shall not exist within the United States, or in any place
subject to their jurisdiction."0
A series of United States Supreme Court cases 9 have invalida-
ted statutes providing for punishment when work contracted for had
not been performed. The most recent, Pollack v. Williams,30 in-
volved a Florida statute which made the inducement and accept-
ance of money under a contract, coupled with nonperformance of
the contract, a misdeameanor. In holding that a state cannot "make
criminal sanctions available for holding unwilling persons to
labor,"'" the Supreme Court reasoned:
[I]n general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working
conditions, or treatment is the right to change employers. When
the master can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obliga-
tion to go on, there is no power below to redress and no incentive
above to relieve a harsh overloardship or unwholesome conditions
of work. Resulting depression of working conditions and living
standards affects not only the laborer under the system, but every
26. 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964).
27. 63 F. 310 (7th Cir. 1894).
28. Id. at 317-18.
19. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911);
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). These cases are familiarly referred to as the
peonage cases.
30. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
31. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 30:739
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other with whom his labor comes in competition. Whatever of
social value there may be, and of course it is great, in enforcing
contracts and collection of debts, Congress has put it beyond
debate that no indebtedness warrants a suspension of the right
to be free from compulsory service.32
Despite both the equitable principles and the thirteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court of Florida in Wilson v. Sandstrom
approved the trial court's injunction compelling the kennel owners
to provide dogs.33 The kennel owners' contention that their incarcer-
ation for failure to comply with their contracts constituted involun-
tary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment was dis-
missed on the rather disingenuous grounds that a "greyhound is not
a 'party' as provided in the United States Constitution, Amendment
Thirteen, § 1.' 1 The court concluded that "[elven if we assume
that some personal service is involved in the requirement that the
kennel owners produce their unique product, temporary relief
should nevertheless be granted.
35
32. Id.
33. Although the court vacillates as to whether or not these contracts were of a personal
service nature, the evidence clearly indicates that in ordering the injunction, the trial court
judge assumed that they were. See Record at 161, Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d 732 (Fla.
1975).
34. 317 So. 2d at 738.
35. Id. As authority, the court quoted 17 FLA. JUR. Injunctions § 37 (1958):
Many of the cases in which equity has been asked to enjoin a breach of contract
arise from disputes concerning contracts for personal services. Underlying the
exercise of the injunctive power in such cases is the difficulty of replacing such
service, and the inadequacy of damages as compensation for such loss. Injunctive
relief, therefore, is often invoked to prevent violation of contracts calling for
personal services or acts of a special character, or for such services by persons of
eminence in their calling, possessing special qualifications. It follows clearly that
reasons for equitable intervention are wholly lacking in cases of ordinary employ-
ment, where no personal contract or peculiar influence of the employee over the
customers of his employer exists, and where the services are without special merit
and are such as can be readily supplied or obtained from others without much
difficulty or expense. In such cases injunctive relief will be denied.
The only authority cited for this proposition, which is almost unanimously rejected by Ameri-
can courts, is American Jurisprudence. Whether the first edition of American Jurisprudence
supports the Florida Jurisprudence doctrine is at least questionable; it is a certainty that the
second edition does not:
Equity will not, by decreeing specific performance or by issuing a mandatory
injunction, compel one person against his will to employ or serve another although
he has contracted to do so. Speaking generally, it may be said that it is the right
of an employer to discharge his employee and of the employer's service subject to
no other penalty than a judgement for damages for breach of the contract. Neither
will a court of equity, indirectly or negatively, by means of an injunction restrain-
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It seems apparent that the supreme court's approval" of the
trial court's injunction and ensuing contempt orders runs contrary
to the spirit and letter of the thirteenth amendment. The fact that
the court saw its action as a necessity because of the "great public
interest" involved in keeping racing tracks open is probably of little
comfort to the kennel owners who were incarcerated. Equally dis-
trubing are the procedural irregularities inherent in the hearing of
evidence in the trial court during attempted removal to a federal
court, which the supreme court also approved.
The supreme court's holding on the removal issue, however,
may not be wholly without merit. It appears that section 1446(e), if
construed as written, would allow attempted removal to be used as
a dilatory tactic. The defendant may well desire to delay trial and
could accomplish this by a specious attempted removal. It is doubt-
ful whether this prospect is any more attractive than subjecting the
defendant to the possibility of having the state court proceed while
he is attempting to remove to federal court, as in Wilson v.
Sandstrom. It is suggested that if the removal procedure is found
to be abused, the solution of the problem is properly in the Congres-
sional domain, perhaps as an amendment to section 1446(e) prohib-
iting specious removals.
As to the thirteenth amendment issue, the supreme court's
holding suggests unresolved issues. Intended primarily as a device
to assure the Black man total emancipation, the amendment has
never been given a wide latitude outside that area and has been
limited in some instances.37 The thirteenth amendment has never
ing the violation of the contract, compel the affirmative performance from day to
day or the affirmative acceptance of merely personal services. It has been said
that this refusal is based in part upon the difficulty or impossibility of enforce-
ment and of passing judgment upon the quality of performance, and in part upon
the undesirability of compelling the continuance of personal association after
disputes have arisen and confidence and loyalty are gone. In some cases it has
been observed that an award of that character against an employee would seem
like the enforcement of involuntary servitude, and to award it against an employer
would constitute an attempt by the courts to run the business of the country,
which would be dangerous.
42 AM. JUR. 2d Injunctions § 101 (1969).
36. Four of the five justices approved the entire opinion. Justice Boyd dissented as to
the authorization of specific performance compelling the owners to race their greyhounds
because "this constitutes involuntary servitude in conflict with the Thirteenth Amend-
ment .. " 317 So. 2d at 742.
37. See, e.g., Aver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (conscription for military serv-
ices does not violate the thirteenth amendment); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (Florida
[Vol. 30:739
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been construed by the United States Supreme Court to allow an
unrestricted right to strike, although one federal district court has
so held." It should be noted that Wilson v. Sandstrom itself does
not present the problem of the outer limits of the thirteenth
amendment in this area since the kennel owners themselves were
incarcertated for not working, rather than the more ordinary prob-
lem of union officials who are jailed for calling illegal strikes. How-
ever, Wilson v. Sandstrom may presage an increasing tension be-
tween an individual's thirteenth amendment rights and society's
dependence on that individual's services.
HARLEY S. TROPIN
Contribution Act Construed-Should Joint And
Several Liability Have Been Considered First?
This article examines the various issues and legal concepts
regarding apportionment of damages between parties presented
in a recent Supreme Court of Florida decision. The relationship
between comparative negligence, joint and several liability, and
contribution among joint tortfeasors is discussed. The author is
critical of the court's focusing its analysis on the collateral issue
of contribution among tortfeasors rather than on the central issue
of the case-joint and several liability. In addition, the potential
inconsistencies between the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act and the underlying principles of Hoffman v. Jones are
noted, and the author urges resolution of those conflicts.
Two automobiles collided at an intersection resulting in injury
to a passenger in one of the automobiles. Issen, the injured passen-
ger, brought suit against Lincenberg, the driver-owner of the car in
could, because of "ancient usage," constitutionally require able-bodied men to work on public
roads); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (proscription of involuntary servitude was
not intended to apply to sailors' contracts, because of the "exceptional nature" of the sailors'
duties). It is doubtful, however, that the occupation of racing greyhounds falls into any of
the "historical exceptions."
38. United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845, 849 (N.D. Ill. 1946), rev'd on other
grounds, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); see Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUSTON L. REv. 593, 604: "A constitutional right to strike may
well be derived from the proscription of involuntary servitude contained in the thirteenth
amendment, as reenforced by the first amendment guarantees of free speech and peaceful
assembly."
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